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Abstract 
 
Indonesia is undergoing transition and soon, a new president will be inaugurated. The new 
president brings promises of new foreign and defence policy for Indonesia, building upon 
Indonesia’s prior principles and putting renewed consideration on Indonesia’s geopolitical 
position in the Indo-Pacific. This paper examines the “maritime axis”, the concept coined 
by President Joko Widodo and the possible changes in Indonesian foreign and defence policy 
required as to achieve the maritime axis. In foreign policy, Indonesia is expected to 
contribute more to the Indian Ocean Rim Association while maintaining its ASEAN 
centrality. In defence, there is a significant change in Indonesia’s defence outlook from 
land-based to maritime-based. Also, Indonesia looks towards India as a security partner in 
securing the Indian Ocean.  
 
Keywords: Strategic environment, security community, maritime axis, foreign 
policy, defence policy. 
 
Introduction 
 
During the third presidential debate 
on 22 June 2014, presidential candidate Joko 
Widodo, or commonly recognized as 
‚Jokowi‛, promoted the idea of Indonesia 
being a ‚maritime axis‛ in Southeast Asia. 
Being a ‚maritime axis‛, based on Joko 
Widodo’s policy platform on defence and 
foreign policy submitted to the General 
Elections Commission (KPU), would secure 
Indonesia’s economic and security interests in 
the maritime sector while also boosting 
Indonesia’s identity as a maritime power and 
archipelagic nation. Following his 
inauguration in October 2014, Jokowi now has 
the opportunity to fulfil his ambitions of 
Indonesia being a global maritime axis. 
Changes to Indonesia’s foreign and 
defence policy to achieve Jokowi’s ambitious 
‚maritime axis‛ are inevitable. Thus, this 
article aims to examine the possible changes 
and continuities to Indonesian foreign and 
defence policy in relation to the addition of 
the ‚maritime axis‛. These include a change in 
multilateral engagement through the addition 
of the Indian Ocean Rim as a location of 
interest and in Indonesia’s defence outlook. 
However, while changes will be present, the 
sacrosanct principles of Indonesia’s ‚free and 
active‛ foreign policy will remain the same. 
This article first provides a review on 
the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. 
It notes the changing strategic environment in 
the Indo-Pacific, with the involvement of great 
powers and the emergence of the Indian 
Ocean as a new geopolitical interest. Then, we 
examine the ‚maritime axis‛ doctrine and the 
changes that it would bring to Indonesia’s 
foreign and defence policy. 
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The Changing Regional Strategic 
Environment of the Indo-Pacific 
 
The strategic environment of the Indo-
Pacific is steadily becoming unpredictable. In 
the Pacific, Gindarsah (2014) notes that major 
powers in the region will prefer strategic 
competition over cooperation. China’s 
military growth, combined with its increased 
assertiveness and economic power, is steadily 
becoming a power that should be treated with 
caution. In the South China Sea, the PLA 
Navy has made their advance into contested 
waters near Malaysia and the Philippines.1 On 
the other hand, the U.S. is increasing their 
presence in the region through their ‘Asia 
Pivot’, or rebalance strategy, which aims to 
maintain the U.S’ strategic and economic 
commitments.2  Mahadevan (2013) notes that 
once the ‘pivot’ has been fully completed, it is 
expected that almost 60 percent of the U.S. 
Navy will be stationed in the Pacific. 
On a regional level, ASEAN has been 
an important cornerstone for Indonesian 
foreign policy and ultimately, the 
advancement of Indonesian national interest. 
However, ASEAN remains incapable of 
resolving ongoing security conflicts amongst 
and within its members and other great 
powers in the region. The South China Sea 
dispute continues to be a potentially 
disruptive issue within ASEAN. With four 
ASEAN members as claimants in the dispute 
and the presence of two major powers in the 
region, ASEAN cohesion is being tested. The 
Philippines’ relations with China remains 
tense and as a result, the Philippines have 
turned to the U.S. and Japan for support. The 
                                                          
1 East Asian Strategic Review, p. 160 
2 Clinton, Hillary. 11 October 2011. America’s Pacific 
Century. Foreign Policy. Accessed on 2 September 
2014 from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/
americas_pacific_century 
U.S. is expected to provide increased military 
assistance to the Philippines in order to face 
China3, while Japan and the Philippines have 
signed a defence agreement. 4  Vietnam is 
actively diversifying its security choices by 
engaging Russia, the U.S., China, India, and 
Japan in military diplomacy. 5  Furthermore, 
ASEAN and China have yet to conclude a 
legally binding Code of Conduct, hindering 
peaceful resolution in the South China Sea.6 
Aside from multilateral disputes, ASEAN 
members also have their respective security 
issues which, if remain unhandled, could 
affect the stability of the region. Thailand 
faces a turbulent political situation due to 
continued rows with anti-government factions 
despite ongoing peace talks. 7  Sectarian 
violence in Myanmar has resurfaced, which 
will severely affect domestic politics, as well 
as foreign relations and economy. 8 
Persecution of minority Muslims has 
influenced other acts in neighbouring 
countries, especially in Indonesia, where there 
have been reports of Rohingya activists 
seeking out help from radical groups in 
Indonesia. It is feared that these oppressed 
minorities might be recruited by a Southeast 
Asia jihad movement, increasing the 
                                                          
3 East Asian Strategic Review, p. 150-151 
4 Department of National Defense Philippines. 
2015. Philippines and Japan Ink Defense Cooperation 
Agreement. Accessed on 20 June 2015 from 
http://www.dndph.org/2015-updates/philippines-
and-japan-ink-defense-cooperation-agreement  
5 East Asian Strategic Review, p. 153-157 
6 The New York Times. 12 July 2012. Asian Leaders 
at Regional Meeting Fail to Resolve Disputes Over 
South China Sea. Accessed on 15 September 2014 
from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/asia/as
ian-leaders-fail-to-resolve-disputes-on-south-
china-sea-during-asean-summit.html 
7 East Asian Strategic Review, p. 165-167 
8 Ibid, p. 170 
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probability of a terrorist threat in Southeast 
Asia.9 
To address these security issues in 
Southeast Asia and to further facilitate 
regional integration in the face of regional 
uncertainties, ASEAN is to launch the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community in 2015. 
However, whether ASEAN could successfully 
achieve the APSC is still debatable. Solidum 
(2003) argues that ASEAN’s institutions and 
existing platforms, such as the ASEAN Way, 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, have provided a 
way for ASEAN to engage in Track Two 
diplomacy and maintain security in the region. 
Acharya (2001) praises ASEAN for being a 
nascent security community despite the many 
challenges that it faces, while Khoo (2004) 
argues that ASEAN’s negative norms hinder 
the formation of a full-fledged security 
community. According to Solidum (2003), 
security in Southeast Asia was a result of 
‚ASEAN values of peace, economic, social, 
and cultural development, cooperation, 
political stability, and regional stability and 
progress‛. On the other hand, Jones and Smith 
(2001) argue that ASEAN is ‚neither a security 
nor an economic community, either in being 
or in prospect.‛ Jones and Smith emphasize 
on the shallow substance of the organization, 
criticizing the organization for producing a 
‚rhetorical and institutional shell‛. 
One interesting point of Jokowi’s 
foreign policy platform is the inclusion of the 
Indian Ocean as an area of Indonesian foreign 
policy interest. Despite being in close 
proximity with the Indian Ocean, it has 
remained out of the Indonesian foreign policy 
lenses for some time. Being out of the 
spotlight for the majority of the 20th century, 
                                                          
9 Chanda, Nayan. 12 March 2014. Rohingyas vs. 
Buddhists? Huffington Post. Accessed on 15 
September 2014 from 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nayan-
chanda/rohingyas-vs-buddhists_b_4950999.html 
the region, known as the Indian Ocean Rim 
(IOR), has lately become an ‚area of crucial 
geostrategic importance‛ and is also described 
as ‚…politically troubled and potentially 
combustible‛ (Michel and Sticklor, 2012). The 
Indian Ocean has become the world’s most 
important energy thoroughfare, fashionably 
described by Kaplan (2009) as an ‚economic 
jugular‛, with 36 per cent of Middle Eastern 
oil passing through the Indian Ocean. 
Developed countries, such as Japan, China 
and the U.S., rely heavily on Middle Eastern 
oil imports. Furthermore, the littoral states 
around the Indian Ocean also boasts 
abundant economic resources, such as gold, 
diamonds, oil and gas reserves. Two-thirds of 
the world’s oil reserves and one-third of 
global gas reserves are located in littoral states 
of the Indian Ocean. The emergence of China 
and India further boost the importance of the 
region as they show interest in the sea lanes of 
communication (SLOCs) and the overall 
stability of the states near the Ocean.10 
Both traditional and non-traditional 
maritime issues riddle the Indian Ocean 
region. In a traditional sense, the Indian 
Ocean is home to some of the world’s largest 
military spenders. With the increased 
attention from major powers, the region is 
prone to traditional security threats such as a 
potential security dilemma fuelled by 
suspicions between the U.S., China, and India. 
The three powers are the top five world 
military powers11 and all have interests in the 
region. The U.S. maintains strategic interests 
in the Indian Ocean as it is vital for the 
execution of U.S. foreign policy, which 
involves mobilization of troops for NATO 
campaigns in the Middle East. China is also 
seeking to increase its influence in the Indian 
Ocean in an attempt to balance the U.S. by 
                                                          
10Rumley, Dennis (ed.) 2013. The Indian Ocean 
Region: Security, Stability, and Sustainability in the 
21st Century. Australia India Institute.  
11 The Military Balance 2014. 
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investing in ports along the Indian Ocean to 
form their ‚string of pearls‛. Stuck in the 
middle is India, wary of two great powers 
showing seeking to expand their influence in 
the Indian Ocean. The region also faces a 
nuclear proliferation issue. Tensions are still 
running high between Iran and Pakistan. 
There is a possibility that ongoing tensions 
might cause Iran to adopt a more aggressive 
nuclear strategy to face Pakistan. Pakistani 
nukes are also prone to falling into the wrong 
hands, increasing the fear of nuclear 
proliferation.12 The Indian Ocean is becoming 
a ‚nuclear ocean‛ and may play a role in the 
regional uranium trade. 13  While in a non-
traditional sense, unsecure sea routes along 
the Indian Ocean provide ample opportunities 
for pirates and maritime terrorism. In 2004, 
the al-Baqra oil terminal came under attack by 
suicide bombers.14 In terms of maritime piracy, 
from 2001, attacks on energy vessels passing 
through the Indian Ocean occurred in the 
Malacca Strait. However, from 2008, more 
incidents of maritime piracy occurred near 
Africa due to Somali pirates gaining increased 
capacity to operate offshore. As a result, in 
August 2008, a ‚security corridor‛ was 
established in Somali waters to grant safe 
passage to merchant vessels.15 
Attempts to bring order to the Indian 
Ocean began in 1997 with the formation of the 
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as a 
multilateral platform to facilitate cooperation 
among the states in the Indian Ocean. IORA 
                                                          
12 Behravesh, Maysam. 11 November 2014. The 
Nuclear Implications of Iran-Pakistan Tensions. 
Accessed on 20 June 2015 from 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-nuclear-
implications-of-iran-pakistan-tensions/  
13 Ibid. 
14 The Guardian. 25 April 2004. Suicide bombers in 
boat attack on Iraq oil terminal. Accessed on 15 
September 2014 from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/25/ir
aq2 
15 Rumley, 2013, pp. 62-63 
adopts an ‚open regionalism‛ approach, 
similar to APEC, which is centred on non-
binding commitments on a voluntary basis 
and agreement by consensus (Kelegama, 2002). 
Driven mostly by economic interests, IORA 
seeks to provide sustainable growth for its 
members, mutual economic cooperation, and 
promote a liberal trade regime in the region. 
In 2011, during India’s term as chair, IORA 
added six priorities as the institution’s agenda, 
namely (1) Maritime Safety and Security; (2) 
Trade and Investment Facilitation; (3) 
Fisheries Management and Sustainable 
Harvesting of Marine Food Resources; (4) 
Disaster Risk Reduction; (5) Academic and 
S&T Cooperation; and (6) Tourism Promotion 
and Cultural Exchanges. 16  Thus, the IORA 
agenda expanded from merely trade to 
include maritime and environmental security. 
Though IORA seeks to provide a 
regional platform for cooperation in the 
region, it faces several challenges. Wagner 
(2013) notes IORA having a ‚peculiar 
legitimacy problem‛. Most IORA members 
are littoral states. According to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
littoral states cannot exercise sovereignty 
beyond the 12-mile line and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), as the high seas are a 
public good where states have no claim (res 
communis). Thus, maritime issues occurring in 
the high seas would require cooperation from 
the international community. Furthermore, 
there are concerns, such as from Kelegama 
(2002), that deeper integration among 
members would be unachievable due to stark 
differences among members. Members of the 
IORA come from different political and 
economic backgrounds, such as the developed 
Australia to the less developed Bangladesh. In 
Kelegama’s words, members of the IORA are 
‚…too diverse, geographically scattered with 
different levels of development in member 
                                                          
16 Ministry of External Affairs. 2012. Annual Report 
2011-2012. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. 
36  
 
Jokowi’s Maritime Axis: Change and Continuity of Indonesia’s Role 
 
countries for any meaningful integration to 
take place.‛ Based on Kelegama’s 
observations, the IORA has yet to become an 
effective regional architecture for maritime 
security. The absence of a shared interest 
inhibits the development of definite 
cooperation among IORA members. Though 
there have been initiatives, such as the Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and limited 
joint naval exercises, security cooperation 
among members are more operational-based 
and less policy-based (Santikajaya, 2014).   
On a domestic level, Indonesia has 
long retained its inward-looking posture. The 
Armed Forces (TNI) is more geared towards 
internal threats, such as separatism and 
domestic violence, and maintaining national 
stability. 17  Power projection across the seas 
has been the least of Indonesia’s priorities for 
the last decade. As of such, the Armed Forces 
emphasize more on land forces rather than 
maritime forces. According to the IISS (2014), 
in 2014, the Indonesian Navy only has 65 000 
personnel amongst the total of 300 400 
personnel. This condition is understandable, 
as Indonesia wishes to maintain a peaceful 
profile rather than an assertive profile. 
However, considering the size of the 
Indonesia’s territory, the size of Indonesia’s 
military is not enough to meet the Minimum 
Essential Force (MEF), especially in maritime 
security. Additionally, Indonesia’s indigenous 
strategic industries, especially the 
shipbuilding industry represented by PT PAL, 
have been slow to develop due to high 
production costs from taxes and insufficient 
facilities and equipment.18 
 
                                                          
17 Ministry of Defence. 2008. Indonesia Defence 
White Paper 2008. 
18 The Jakarta Post. 14 August 2013. ‚Shipbuilders 
struggle to meet production targets‛. The Jakarta 
Post,  
accessed 15 May 2015 from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/14/s
hipbuilders-strugglemeet-production-targets.html  
Jokowi’s Maritime Axis: What it Means for 
Foreign Policy and Defence 
 
Jokowi’s ‚maritime axis‛ recognizes 
Indonesia’s geopolitical position as an 
archipelagic state and puts emphasis on the 
maritime domain as a medium for Indonesia’s 
foreign and defence policy. Jokowi’s foreign 
policy outlook emphasizes on Indonesia 
becoming a strong regional maritime power 
not only in strength but also in diplomacy. 
Jokowi’s platform acknowledges the 
importance of maritime diplomacy in 
resolving territorial maritime disputes with 
neighbours, the need to safeguard Indonesia’s 
maritime domain, and alleviating maritime 
tensions between great powers in the region. 
It also emphasizes the importance of the Indo-
Pacific region for the implementation of 
Indonesian foreign policy. Jokowi puts 
forward five points for Indonesia’s regional 
policy i.e. (1) consolidation of Indonesian 
leadership in ASEAN, (2) strengthening 
regional architecture to prevent great power 
hegemony, (3) development of strategic 
bilateral ties, (4) managing the impacts of 
regional economic integration and free trade 
on domestic economy, and (5) 
‚comprehensive maritime cooperation‛ 
through the IORA. 19  Furthermore, in his 
speech at the East Asia Summit in November 
2014, Jokowi further elaborated on his 
‚maritime axis‛ doctrine by listing the five 
pillars of the maritime axis, namely (1) revival 
of Indonesian maritime culture and ultimately, 
archipelagic identity; (2) development of 
oceans and fisheries; (3) improving maritime 
economy; (4) maritime diplomacy to address 
illegal fishing and other security threats; and 
(5) boosting Indonesia’s maritime defences 
(Neary, 2014).  
                                                          
19 Widodo, Joko and Kalla, Jusuf. May 2014. Jalan 
Perubahan untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri 
dan Berkepribadian – Visi Misi, Dan Program Aksi 
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ASEAN has always been the 
cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy in 
the Asia-Pacific and it will likely remain as 
such. From its foundation, Indonesia has been 
active in ASEAN to pursue its regional 
interests. However, with Jokowi’s emerging 
‚maritime axis‛ and subsequent policies, 
there are indications that ASEAN might be 
losing its centrality as Indonesia’s main 
multilateral platform. As observed by 
Syailendra (2015), Indonesia’s ‚high profile‛ 
foreign policy approach shows signs of 
declining engagement in ASEAN in favour of 
a more nationalistic approach. Recent events, 
such as the sinking of illegal fishing ships and 
reluctance to participate in the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), can be 
interpreted as signs of Indonesia’s moving 
away from its ASEAN centrality. However, 
developing a more nationalistic approach 
towards ASEAN does not necessarily mean 
that Indonesia will strike ASEAN off its 
multilateral institutions list. ASEAN has 
provided Indonesia with a platform for 
settling disputes with major powers and 
connect existing regional organizations within 
the Asia-Pacific region. Through ASEAN, 
Indonesia has managed to connect Southeast 
Asia with some of the larger players in the 
Asia-Pacific. For example, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum has provided a means for 
discussion and cooperation on Asia-Pacific 
security issues between the U.S., China, and 
Japan. Jokowi’s approach to foreign policy can 
be considered as pragmatic rather than 
nationalistic. He aims to show that Indonesia 
is willing to cooperate with other countries, 
but not to the extent of comprising national 
interest. This approach corresponds nicely 
with Jokowi’s vision of consolidating 
Indonesian leadership in ASEAN. It implies 
Indonesia’s intent on playing a bigger role in 
ASEAN to further Indonesian national 
interest through ASEAN as an important 
foothold in establishing the ‚maritime axis‛. 
Indonesian interest in the Indian 
Ocean is a new addition to Indonesia’s foreign 
policy following Jokowi’s ‚maritime axis‛. In 
particular, in October 2015, Indonesia will 
chair the IORA for two years, succeeding 
Australia as the former chair. It is likely that 
Jokowi’s ‚maritime axis‛ takes into account 
Indonesia’s position in IORA. Since the 
addition of six priorities in 2011, IORA’s 
agenda has a lot in common with Indonesia’s 
interests in the Indian Ocean, particularly 
maritime security and economic interests 
according to Jokowi’s pillars of the ‚maritime 
axis‛. For example, IORA’s agenda on 
maritime safety and security coincides with 
Jokowi’s interest of developing the Indonesian 
Navy to better provide regional security 
against illegal fishing and piracy. Despite 
IORA still being in a stage of development, 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi 
insists that IORA remains as a part of 
Indonesian foreign policy in creating the 
‚maritime axis‛. Despite IORA’s 
shortcomings, such as a lack of coherent 
security architecture, Marsudi explains 
Indonesia’s participation in IORA as being 
based on what Indonesia could contribute for 
the IORA rather than what IORA could 
provide for Indonesia. 20  This stance can be 
considered related to the ‚active‛ part of 
Indonesian foreign policy, where the Foreign 
Minister sees Indonesia as playing a more 
active role in developing the regional 
organization to suit its national interests. 
Jokowi’s ‚maritime axis‛ envisions 
Indonesia’s Navy as a regional maritime 
power in the Indo-Pacific. 21  This marks a 
                                                          
20 Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 
February 2015. Menlu RI: Melalui Keketuaan IORA, 
Indonesia Perkuat Poros Maritim. Accessed 20 June 
2015 from 
http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/News.aspx?IDP=72
55&l=id  
21 Widodo, Joko and Kalla, Jusuf. May 2014. Jalan 
Perubahan untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri 
dan Berkepribadian – Visi Misi, Dan Program Aksi  
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serious change in Indonesia’s previously-held 
threat perceptions, which were mostly 
focused on a continental defence outlook. The 
previous Defence White Paper, published in 
2008, puts much emphasis on internal security 
concerns, such as separatism and internal 
violence related to ethnicity, religion, race, 
and communities, and maintaining 
continental defence, while putting little regard 
for the numerous naval chokepoints, EEZs, 
and outer islands in Indonesia. Furthermore, 
the lack of Indonesian presence in its 
territorial waters has caused Indonesia to 
suffer from a lack of deterrence, especially 
against illegal traders using Indonesia’s 
waterways and island claims by neighbours.22 
To that end, Jokowi plans to gradually 
increase the defence budget by 1.5 percent 
over five years, which is to be channelled into 
defence equipment procurement, rejuvenating 
the Indonesian strategic industry and 
developing maritime infrastructure. The 
increased defence budget is also expected to 
fund defensive measures in Indonesian waters, 
such as a military base equipped with combat 
aircraft in Natuna to protect the island against 
a potential flashpoint in the South China Sea.23 
But most importantly, the defence budget will 
be channelled to bolster Indonesia’s naval 
capacity to reach the MEF required to 
safeguard Indonesian waters. 
There is a possibility of Indonesia 
securing its relationship with India as a 
strategic partner to carry out the ‚maritime 
axis‛, as both countries share similar interests. 
The two countries have a long history of 
bilateral and multilateral ties, especially in the 
                                                          
22 Jakarta Post. 22 March 2007. RI lacks deterrence 
force: Juwono. Accessed 20 June 2015 from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/03/22/ri
-lacks-deterrence-force-juwono.html  
23 Tempo. 10 September 2014. Indonesia to Build 
Military Base in Natuna. Accessed 23 June 2015 
from 
http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/10/05560576
7/Indonesia-to-Build-Military-Base-in-Natuna  
realm of security and economy. Since the 
1990s, India has been expanding its ‚sphere of 
influence‛ in the Indian Ocean and to a larger 
extent, Southeast Asia, by promoting itself as 
‚benign provider of maritime security‛ 
(Brewster, 2011). In 2001, both countries 
signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement and 
since then, have conducted numerous defence 
exchanges. Under the Defence Cooperation 
Agreement, Indonesia-India security ties also 
expanded to defence industry cooperation; 
however, progress in the area seems to be 
slow. Indonesia has yet to acquire India’s 
Brahmos cruise missile technology. According 
to Brewster (2011, p. 233), Indonesia’s limited 
defence budget and India’s limitations are the 
key factors hindering further security 
relations. Aside from defence industry 
cooperation, India and Indonesia have also 
been active in maritime security in the 
Andaman Sea. Since the 1990s, India and 
Indonesia have conducted joint naval 
exercises and naval visits to bases in 
Andaman and Nicobar (Brewster, 2011). In 
trade, bilateral trade between the two 
countries reached US$ 20.1 billion in 2012-
2013 and Indonesia has become India’s 
second-largest trading partner in ASEAN 
(Ministry of External Affairs, 2014). Import-
export from the two countries ranges from 
palm oil to pharmaceuticals. These existing 
bilateral relations, added with shared interests 
in the Indo-Pacific and membership in IORA, 
could become the basis of a fruitful 
relationship in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
 
President Joko Widodo’s ambitions of 
a ‚pan-Indo-Pacific‛ Indonesia is represented 
in his maritime axis doctrine of foreign and 
defence policy. The ‚maritime axis‛ doctrine 
shows a significant expansion in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy and defence ambitions. Not 
only will Indonesia strive to maintain its 
ASEAN centrality, it also seeks to expand the 
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Indonesian sphere of influence by ‚looking 
west‛ towards the Indian Ocean. To achieve 
those ends, Jokowi has decided upon a 
number of measures, such as reforming the 
nation’s defence outlook to accommodate a 
more outward-looking and maritime posture, 
increasing the defence budget to procure 
defence equipment, using multilateral 
platforms to engage with great powers in the 
region, and actively contribute towards 
institution-building in the Indo-Pacific. These 
measures will likely be the highlights of the 
Jokowi administration throughout his term. 
Despite these changes, Indonesia’s foreign 
policy principles of ‚free and active‛ will 
continue to be the foundation of future 
policies. Jokowi’s maritime axis will see to an 
Indonesia that plays a larger role in building 
the Indo-Pacific region.  
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